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VIRGINIA BELIJ TAYLOR, Appellant, v. A. J. HAWKINSON, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-A
and an order
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are
appealable, but not the jury verdict or an order denying a
new trial.
[2] Judgments-Res Judicata-Identities Demanded: Estoppel in
Action on Different Cause.-vvhere the causes of action and
the parties are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar
to a second action; and where the causes of action are different
but the parties are the same, the doctrine of res judicata applies so as to render conclusive matters which were decided
in the first judgment.
(3] Id.-Res Judicata-Identity of Causes of Action: Matters Concluded.-A prior judgment operates as a bar against a second
action on the same cause, but in a later action on a different
claim or cause it operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually
litigated and determined in the first.
[4] Appeal-Objections-New Trial-Verdict.--In an action by
husband and wife and the driver of an automobile in which
the wife was riding for
arising out of a collision,
where the evidence supported the trial court's implied finding
that the verdicts for plaintiffs following the first trial were
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine the
issue of liability, and where the wife's motion for new trial
was granted on the ground that the damages were insufficient,
failure of defendant or plaintiff's husband and the driver to
move for a new trial was tantamount to accepting the jury's
compromise as their own.
[5] Judgments-Res Judicata-Matters Not Adjudicated.-In an
action by husband and wife and the driver of an automobile
in which the wife was riding for damages arising out of a
collision, compromise verdicts for plaintiffs did not constitute
such a determination of the issues of liability as to render
them res judicata on subsequent retrial of the action where
the wife, who alone was granted a motion for new trial on the

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, .Tudgm<•nts, ~ 314 <'t sPq.; Am.Jur., .Tuilgmrnts,
§ 161 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal aml
§~ 2fi, 48.1, 74; [2]
Judgments, §§ 355, 367; [3] Judgments, ~§ 357, 3!!5(1); [4] Ap~
peal and Error, § 235; [5] Judgments, § 339.
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ground that the damages were insufficient, sought to limit the
trial to the issue of damages on the ground that the judgment
in favor of her husband and the driver was conclusive against
defendant on the issue of liability, since defendant did not
have his day in court during the first trial on the issue of
liability.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, from a jury verdict, and from orders denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for
new triaL Walter R. Evans, Judge.* Judgment and order
denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
affirmed; appeal from jury verdict and order denying a new
trial, dismissed.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
collision of vehicles. ,Judgment for defendant affirmed.
N. E. Youngblood and William R. Grant for Appellant.
Wyman & Finell and Saul Grayson for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Virginia 'l'aylor, hereinafter referred to
as plaintiff, was injured when the car in which she was riding
was struck from the rear by a car driven by defendant. The
car was registered in the name of her husband and was being
driven by a friend, Laurine Holibaugh. Plaintiff, her husband, and the driver brought an action for damages against
defendant, and the jury returned verdicts of $65 for personal
injuries suffered by the driver, $63.06 in favor of plaintiff's
husband for damages to the car, and $371.94 for personal
injuries suffered by plaintiff. Judgment was entered on the
verdicts, and plaintiff alone moved for a new trial on the
ground that the damages were insufficient. Her motion was
granted and thereafter the judgment in favor of her husband
and the driver became finaL On retrial plaintiff sought to
limit the trial to the issue of damages on the ground that
the judgment in favor of her husband and the driver was
conclusive against defendant on the issue of liability. Over
her objection the trial court submitted the issue of liability
to the jury, which returned a verdict for defendant. Judgment was entered on the
and plaintiff's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative,
*Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council.
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for a new trial \vas denied. [1] Plaintiff appeals from the
judgment,
and the order denying her motion
for judgment
the verdiet or for a new trial.
Since only the
and the order denying the motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are appealable
(Code Civ.
§ 963), the other appeals are dismissed.
Plaintiff contends that this ease is governed by the rule
stated in Ber·nharcl v. B(];nk of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 813
l122 P.2d 892], that "In determining the validity of a plea
of res judicata three questions are pertinent: \Vas the issue
decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question 1 \Vas there a final judgment on the merits? \Vas the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?" lVIoreover, she asserts that even if a requirement of mutuality of estoppel should be deemed essential in
this case, it is met by the fact that she was in privity with
her husband in his cause of action for damages to the car.
(Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 321 [202 P.2d 73, 6 A..L.R.
2d 461] .) Defendant contends, on the other hand, that even
though the judgment in favor of the husband and the driver
may be final for some purposes, since it was entered in
the same action in which plaintiff's motion for a new trial
was granted and since the issue of defendant's negligence was
common to all parts of the first judgment, the part as to which
a new trial was neither sought nor granted cannot be res
judicata as to the issues set at large by the granting of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. (See American Enterprise,
Inc. v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d 210, 218 [246 P.2d 935].)
It may be conceded that the judgment in favor of plaintiff's
husband and the driver is now final, that their causes of action
are merged therein, and that it constitutes a bar to any
further prosecution of their original claims. [2] As was
pointed out in Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 201-202 [99
P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ; the doctrine of res judicata has two
aspects. "First, where the causes of action and the parties
are the same, a prior judgment is a complete bar in the
second action. 'fhis is fundamental and is everywhere eonceded.
"Second, where the causes of action are different but the
parties are the same, the doctrine applies so as to render
conclusive matters which were decided by the first judgment.
[3] As this court said in Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690,
695 [28 P.2d 916]: 'A. prior judgment operates as a bar against
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a second action
the same cause, but m a later action
upon a different elaim or
of
it operates as an
estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the
second action as were actually litigated and determined in
the first action.' '' In the present case, since plaintiff's cause
of action is different from those of her husband and the
driver, we are concerned with the second
stated above,
and the question presented is whether defendant's liability
was a matter decided or an issue that was actually litigated
and determined within the meaning of the foregoing rule.
[ 4] There is ample evidence to support the trial court's
implied finding that the verdicts following the first trial were
compromise verdicts and that the jury did not determine
the issue of liability. The damages awarded plaintiff were
less than her special damages, and the parties concede that
they were so inadequate that a new trial limited to the issue
of damages would have been improper. (See Rose v. Melody
Lane, 39 Cal.2d 481, 489 [247 P.2d 335] .) Moreover, it is
obvious that if the jury failed to determine the issue of
liability in returning the verdict for plaintiff, it also failed
to determine that issue in returning the verdicts for her
husband and the driver. Accordingly, had defendant or
plaintiff's husband and the driver moved for a new trial,
it would have been granted, and their failure to do so was
tantamount to accepting the jury's compromise as their
own. (See Leipert v. Honold, 39 Cal.2d 462, 470-471 [247
P.2d 324, 29 A.L.R.2d 1185].) [5] Regardless of the effectiveness of such a compromise in extinguishing the causes
of action or in settling the rights directly involved therein
(see Partridge v. Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 475 [12 P. 480] ;
Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380, 389 [238 P. 81] ; FitzGerald
v. Terminal Dev. Co., 11 Cal.App.2d 126, 135-136 [53 P.2d
177, 55 P .2d 194] ) , it does not constitute such a determination
of the issues involved as to render them res judicata where
distinct rights are sought to be litigated in a separate cause
of action. (United States v. International Bt~ilding Co., 345
U.S. 502, 506 [73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182]; Lawler v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 324, 327 [75 S.Ct.
865, 99 L.Ed. 1122] ; Burgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc.,
311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W.2d 315, 317] ; Reeves v. Philadelphia
Gas Works Co., 107 Pa. Super. 422 [164 A. 132, 134] ; Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore, 167 F.2d 324, 330; Marchant v.
Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3 N.Y.S.2d 496,
498] ; see Hall v. Coyle, 38 Cal.2d 543, 546 [241 P.2d 236] ;
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Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839, 843 [129 P.2d 390] ; Rest.,
Judgments, § 68.) To hold otherwise would tend to defeat
rather than to promote the objective of preventing vexatious
litigation with its attendant expense both to the parties and
the public. Defendant did not have his day in court during the first trial on the issue of liability, and plaintiff
can now justify making that judgment binding upon him
in her action only on the ground that he had an opportunity
to attack it. Had he done so, more rather than less litigation
would have ensued, and plaintiff would have gained nothing.
Defendant did not vex her by seeking a redetermination of
an issue once decided, but sought and secured only the right
to have the issue of liability determined once after plaintiff
by securing a new trial on all issues had established the
propriety thereof.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that a judgment, which on its face determines
the question of liability in a negligence action, is not res
judicata on that issue by way of collateral estoppel in another
action on the theory that the question of liability was not
decided because the jury in the first action assertedly compromised on the issue of liability. Whatever way you cut it,
the result reached by the majority is that an alleged compromise verdict (balancing liability against the amount of damages) is subject to collateral attack on that ground.
The facts are not involved and some legal points are clear
and these are conceded by the majority. Three plaintiffs
obtained judgments against defendant in an action in which
his liability is based, by virtue of the pleadings, the instructions to the jury, the jury's verdict and the judgment itself,
on the negligence of the defendant; that issue was necessarily
involved, indeed, it was the only issue except the fact and
amount of damages. One of the plaintiffs was granted a new
trial, but as to the others, the judgment became final, and
the trial court denied the plea of res judicata on the retrial
as to the one plaintiff. There was a privity between the
plaintiff obtaining the new trial and one of the other plaintiffs,
her husband (see Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315 [202 P.2d
47 C.2d-29
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73, 6 A.L.It.2d 461] ) , hence there can be no
judgment for the
point is made that these
given in the same action, and I
it the situation would be
no different if they had been obtained in
actions. The judgment for the
was res
judicata as it was based upon
which presented the issue of defendant's
; the
jury was instructed on that issue; its verdict was general,
thus deciding that issue; and the
was on the verdict
and therefore decided that issue. vV e have, therefore, a clear
case of the judgment being res
on the question of
defendant's liability as to one-plaintiff-wife-who was in
privity to the plaintiff-husband (Zaragosa v. Craven, supra).
In such a case we have a situation where under the doctrine
of res judicata, the defendant is collaterally estopped to question the final determination that he was negligent. Yet the
majority arrives at a different conclusion by reasoning that
the verdict on which the judgment was based was a compromise (supposedly low damages because some jurors thought
there should be no liability) which is true because the judgment as to plaintiff-wife, as to which a new trial was granted,
was a compromise because the damages were lower than the
amount of the special damages suffered and proved. It is
then concluded that defendant and plaintiff-husband "accepted'' the compromise verdict and thus, in effect, compromised the res judicata judgment; hence there is no collateral estoppel because a judgment based on a compromise
does not give rise to such estoppel.
Accepting for the moment that reasoning and speaking to
the legal proposition that a judgment based on a compromise
settlement cannot give rise to a collateral estoppel, I find
the law to be otherwise. It is the general rule that a judgment entered by consent or agreement is res judicata in the
sense that it is a bar to another action on the same cause of
action as distinguished from collateral estoppel. (Partridge v.
Shepard, 71 Cal. 470, 475 [12 P. 480] ; City of Oakland v.
Oakland Water Front Co., 162 Cal. 675, 686 [124 P. 251];
Semple v. Wright, 32 Cal. 659; C1·ossman v. Davis, 79 Cal.
603 [21 P. 963] ; Moore v. Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 P.
81]; Nielsen v. Eme1·son, 119 Cal.App. 214 [6 P.2d 281];
Guaranty L. Corp. v. Boanl of Supervisors, 22 Cal.App.2d
684 [71 P.2d 931]; Patterson v. Spring Valley Water Co., 207
Cal. 739 [279 P. 1001] ; Goddard v. Secttrity Title Ins. & Guar.
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; Lamb v. II en1don, 97 CaL
also many cases eited 2 A.L.R.2d
v. Bhepa.rd, supra, 71 Cal.
roll in ,Judson v.
entered by

the
"It may l.Je

is~mcs.

any otl1er judicial record, by
in the court rendering it,
the parties, or by proof of
the reeord. '' And the
as collateral estoppel is inS1tpm, 71 Cal. 470;
Semple v.
t, supra.
Cal. 659; llfcC1·eery v. Fuller,
63 Cal. 30: Cros~mon ,-.
supra, 79 Cal. 603; H elpling v.
Ilelpling, 50
676 95 P. 715]; FitzGerald v. Terminal Dev. Co., H Cal.App.2d J26 [5:1 P.2d 177, 55 P.2d 194].)
It is said in 2 A.TJ.R.2d
543: "As a general proposition,
where a question of fact 0ssential to a judgment is actually
litigatecl and determinc•fl thereby, the determination is eonelusive between the partirs and their privies in a subsequent
action, even though sneh action involves a different cause of
action . . . .
"Except in ea:ses
tax liability for succe;;;sive tax
periods, it is well settlrcl that a
by consent raises
an estoppel in the same way as a Jttdgment entered after
contest, and this has be0n reeognized even by those courts
wl1ich profess to adhere to the theory that a consent judgment
or decree is, strictly
not res jmlicata." (Emphasis
added.) The ease;;; cited in the majority opinion are not
to the contrary. Holl v.
38 Cal.2d 543 [241 P.2d 236],
and Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal.2d 839 [129 P.2d 390], the California cases,
hold that an issue withheld from decision
by the court is llot res j nil ieata or that an action on a compromise of a claim is 11ot the same as an action on the
claim. It is sairl in Unit('rl Stales Y. International Building
Co., :143 U.S.
~05
S.Ct. 807. 97 hErl. 1182]: "A
judgment enici'(·d ·wiill Jllf• conse11t nf the
may involve
a detennilllliinll
of fad an(l law by the court.
But unless a
ihat illat wa;;; the case, the
, flO far as collateral estoppel
entered only as a compro-

evidence of
by
collusion
fraud on the
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mise of the parties." Lawlor v. National Screen Service
Corp., 349 U.S. 322 [75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122], refused
to apply res judicata because to do so would violate an important public policy, the United States anti-trust laws.
Bttrgess v. Consider H. Willett, Inc., 311 Ky. 745 [225 S.W.
2d 315], rejected the proposition that a consent judgment is
res judicata, which as seen is squarely contrary to the law
of this state and nearly all jurisdictions elsewhere. The same
is true of Reeves v. Philadelphia Gas Works Co., 107 Pa.
Super. 422 [164 A. 132], and Fruehanf Trailer Co. v. Gilmore,
167 F.2d 324, and the International Building Company case.
In Marchant v. Buffalo General Hospital, 166 Misc. 234 [3
N.Y.S.2d 496], the issue as to which estoppel by former judgment was sought was not decided by the former judgment.
The decision of the majority is, therefore, contrary to the
established law of this state.
In the foregoing discussion I have accepted the proposition
that this was a consent judgment and pointed out that even
as such it was res judicata, but it was not a consent judgment.
There was no agreement, settlement or compromise except
that which the majority imposes as a matter of law as distinguished from the voluntary understanding of the parties.
The judgment urged as estoppel had been entered. It unquestionably decided the issue of the defendant's liability.
It was rendered after a contest in a trial and on the jury's
verdict. The only consent feature that might arise is because
defendant did not attack the judgment by appeal or otherwise. He permitted it to become final. Nothing occurred in
the conduct of the parties nor in any communication between
them that indicated an actual compromise or agreement to
accept the jury's so-called compromise. The failure to appeal
was nothing more than permitting the judgment to stand by
default, the same as if no answer or contest had been made
to the complaint and a default judgment was entered. As is
said in Helpling v. Helpling, 50 Cal.App. 676, 682 [195 P.
715] : "The appellant's contention that the former judgment
between the parties hereto did not render matters involved
therein res adjudicata for the reason that it was a consent
judgment is not borne out to the extent claimed by the
appellant; for while it appears that the trial judge in an
informal interview with the parties gave expression to some
doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the case, these
doubts were not carried into the formal judgment; and it
has been repeatedly held that the remarks of a trial judge
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made during the progress of the case, even though they amount
to the giving of his reasons for his decision, become no part
of the judgment, and cannot be held to control or alter its
substance and effect. So far as the record herein discloses,
the only matter embraced in said judgment to which it was
suggested that the parties give their consent was that of the
amount and duration of the separate maintenance to be allowed the plaintiff therein. As to all other matters involved
in the case the judgment became res adjttdicata, and hence
properly relied upon by the respondent herein to defeat the
present action." And in Harter v. King County, 11 Wn.2d
583 [119 P.2d 919, 923]: "vVe think the very essence of a
consent decree is that the parties thereto have entered voluntarily into a contract setting the dispute at rest, upon which
contract the court has entered judgment conforming to the
terms of the agreement, without putting the parties to the
necessity of proof." There is here, therefore, no compromise,
consent or settlement judgment. If it is a default judgment
(it became final by default) then we apply the rule that a
judgment by default is the basis of a plea of res judicata or
collateral estoppel in a subsequent action involving the same
matter, and such judgment is just as conclusive upon whatever is essential to support it as is a judgment after contest.
(Burtnett v. King, 33 Cal.2d 805, 810 [205 P.2d 657, 12 A.L.R.
2d 333]; Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal.App.2d 24 [278 P.2d 454];
O'Brien v. Appling, 133 Cal.App.2d 40 [283 P.2d 289]; Estate
of Williams, 36 Cal.2d 289, 292-293 [223 P.2d 248, 22 A.lJ.R.
2d 716]; Horton v. Horton, 18 Cal.2d 579 [116 P.2d 605];
Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal.App.2d 127 [177 P.2d 364] ;
Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 289; Hartson v. Shanklin, 57
Cal. 558; Hartson v. Shanklin, 58 Cal. 248; Maddnx v. Connty
Bank, 129 Cal. 665 [62 P. 264, 79 Am.St.Rep. 143] ; Harvey v.
Griffiths, 133 Cal.App. 17, 23 [23 P.2d 532]; Kittridge v.
Stevens, 16 Cal. 381; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 1 [147 P.
1168]; Brown v. Brown, 170 Cal. 8 [147 P. 1171]; Wattson v.
Dillon, 6 Cal.2d 33 [56 P.2d 220]; San Gabriel Valley Bank v.
Lake View Town Co., 7 Cal. Unrep. 266 [86 P. 727]; Fry v.
Baltimore Hotel Co., 80 Cal.App. 415 [252 P. 752]; 128
A.L.R. 472; 29 Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments,§ 235.)
We are left, then, with no agreement, compromise or settlement, with nothing more than a judgment whose roll on its
face unquestionably decides the question of defendant's liability. Even assuming that that judgment was the result of a
compromise by the jurors, it must create an estoppel-be res
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judicata-unless it may
of some
ground on which it may be attacked.
is made in response to a
of
judgment, it is collateral (
Inn, 45 Cal.2d 448
P.2d
opinion
cites no authority for
on the
ground that the
underlying the
judgment by
opinion admits a collateral attack is not available because it says a
res judicata judgment is final and
as between the
immediate parties thereto. It is no answer to say that the
judgment is not res judicata because being based on a compromise verdict the issue of
was not determined.
(See supra, quotation from Helpling v. IIelpling, 50 Cal.App.
676, 682.) If the jury did not decide that
it decided
nothing, and the judgment entered on its verdict would not
be binding on the parties thereto. 'l'o say it did not decide
the issue is to ignore the pleadings, verdict and judgment, and
to permit a collateral attack on the judgment which is not
permitted.
If the majority opinion is permitted to stand, every judgment entered on a verdict in a personal injury action where
the amount of the verdict is less than the special damages
proved, will be void and subject to collateral attack even after
it becomes final. In other words, there will be no judgment
and the case will remain undetermined to the same extent as
if the jury had failed to agree on either the issue of liability
or damages. The foregoing conclusion must follow from
the reasoning of the majority, as the judgment in favor of
plaintiff-husband, which established defendant's liability for
the injuries suffered by both husband and wife, became final,
and must be res judicata unless it may be collaterally attacked.
If it may be collaterally attacked, it is void, and the case,
even as to plaintiff-husband, has not been determined. I am
sure the majority would not consciously so hold.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and instruct the
trial court to proceed to trial on the sole issue of the amount
of damages suffered by Virginia.

